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COMMENTARY
The Legal Limits of ‘Yes Means Yes’
By Paul H. Robinson JANUARY 10, 2016 
ebate grows over the use of "yes 
means yes" as a sexual-consent 
policy on college campuses. As 
opposed to "no means no," 
which directs sexual initiators to halt their 
advances if the other person struggles or 
says to stop, "yes means yes" or "affirmative 
consent" states that sexual initiators have to 
actually get consent from the other person before proceeding to the next step. California 
and New York have recently mandated such policies, yet many people oppose them. 
Carol L. McCoy, a chancery-court judge in Nashville, last summer overturned a decision
by the University of Tennessee at Chattanooga to expel a student under such a policy, 
holding that it had violated due process.
On one side of the debate are those unhappy with the culture on many campuses that 
seems to allow men to bully women into intercourse, putting the burden of ambiguous 
situations entirely on the woman. In this culture, ambiguity is taken as a green light.
On the other side are those who see the affirmative-consent rule as a violation of the 
basic principles of American criminal justice. As Nadine Strossen, a former president of 
the American Civil Liberties Union, recently noted: "These affirmative-consent rules 
violate rights of due process and privacy. They reverse the usual presumption of 
innocence. Unless the guy can prove that his sexual partner affirmatively consented to 
every single contact, he is presumed guilty of sexual misconduct."
A criminal law that earns moral 
credibility with the community is 
one that has the power to 
persuade people to internalize its 
norms. 
While these two sides may seem to be in irresolvable conflict, they are not. The public 
discussion about affirmative consent seems to have mixed two quite different issues. 
Most criminal-law theorists would point out that there is a crucial difference between 
what they would call in legal jargon an ex ante rule of conduct — that is, telling people 
beforehand what the law requires of them — and an ex post principle of adjudication —
setting the rules by which a violation of the rules of conduct is to be judged.
I think there is little dispute about the value of "yes means yes" as a rule of personal 
conduct understood beforehand by both parties; the only dispute is whether it is an 
appropriate standard to determine liability and punishment if those rules are violated.
We ought to all agree that there is value in 
colleges’ promoting "yes means yes" as 
the proper means by which students deal 
with one another. That announcement 
and its regular public affirmation can help 
change the culture. What is doing the 
work here is not the occasional 
disciplinary case litigated out of the public 
eye, but rather the student body, men and women both, seeing that others accept the 
"yes means yes" standard as proper conduct. Indeed, the unanimity that one can get in 
support of "yes means yes" as a proper rule of conduct will do more toward securing the 
needed cultural shift than the divisive debates now going on, which serve only to 
generate opposition and confusion.
The source of disagreement — what people are objecting to — is not affirmative consent 
as the announced rule of proper conduct, but rather as the rule of ex post adjudication, 
that is, as the standard by which alleged violations are to be tried. One can readily 
understand the fears. Opponents of affirmative consent say it impermissibly shifts the 
burden of proof to the defendant.
Some people, though, are not willing to take a win by having affirmative consent 
accepted as the rule of proper conduct. They insist that unless the rule is used to 
determine liability and punishment, then it has no teeth.
Ambiguity is taken as a green 
light in the current college 
culture. 
But this tension exists in every aspect of criminal law with regard to every prohibited 
offense. For example, the criminal law’s rules of conduct prohibit causing another 
person’s death. Does it undercut that prohibition if we acquit someone who causes 
another person’s death accidentally under circumstances in which a reasonable person 
might have done the same?
Modern American criminal law has 
almost always chosen to require not 
only proof of the harm — causing 
another’s death, or having 
intercourse when the partner is not in 
fact affirmatively agreeing — but also 
to require that there was some minimum level of culpability or blameworthiness in the 
defendant.
Indeed, it is this aspect of criminal law — its commitment to imposing liability only 
when there is sufficient personal blameworthiness — that has given it the moral 
prescriptive power that it has. The criminal law that punishes without regard to blame 
loses moral credibility with the community it governs and is discredited and ignored. A 
criminal law that earns moral credibility with the community is one that has the power 
to persuade people to internalize its norms.
Ironically, it is the reformers seeking to change existing norms — such as the norms of 
sexual consent on college campuses — who would most benefit from a criminal law that 
has earned moral credibility. It is their reform efforts that are most injured when the 
law’s credibility is damaged by using affirmative consent as a standard when 
determining guilt.
The most promising path to changing the culture of sexual consent on college campuses 
is to adopt and regularly reaffirm "yes means yes" as the rule of proper conduct, but to 
reject it as the principle of adjudication.
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